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The publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2013, just five 
years after the emergence of the most recent global economic crisis, vivified debates on the 
nature and essence of “capitalism” within contemporary society.1 Even though focused on the 
period since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, Piketty’s analysis has also stimulated 
a return to old classic debates about the real nature and historical roots of capitalism and its 
multifaceted development.2 This is part of a larger trend encompassing the entirety of 
“economic history”’ which over the last few decades has become, for all intents and 
purposes, synonymous with “history of capitalism”’ 
The long-lived debate on different ways of periodising the development of capitalism 
usually refers to national dynamics of capitalism development.3 Over time, different states 
developed—and still exemplify—different variants of capitalism, and these have recently 
returned to the fore of policy discussion, especially within the lively European debate on how 
these affected the creation of the Eurozone and its subsequent resilience to endogenous and 
exogenous shocks.4 At the same time, the general assumption—and, crucially, the standard 
narrative employed outside of academic circles, in the highbrow press and public 
discussions—is that of a progressive development from ‘proto’ to ‘mature’ capitalism. Even 
given the existence of the variants just mentioned, this implies a somewhat linear 
chronological development of capitalism: in shorthand, from commercial to industrial to 
financial capitalism. Certainly useful when presenting these issues in a preliminary manner, 
this can also limit a proper understanding of the dynamics of economic development. 
This article contributes to the understanding of “Italy and the origin of capitalism” by 
confronting both the “origins” and “varieties” debates, seen through the comparative analysis 
of Italian and English early modern maritime labor. This choice is nontraditional in two 
ways: it deals with a ‘late’ period, usually ignored because the crisis of the Italian economy 
was already evident, and it focuses on the maritime sector, which was rather neglected in the 
classic literature on the Italian origins of capitalism. However, I contend that this alternative 
perspective can provide new stimuli. The article begins by sketching the roots of the 
historiographical debates on capitalism’s ‘origins’ and ‘varieties.’ Then, on the basis of 
ongoing research on maritime trade and employment, it will discuss some of the crucial 
differences between Italy and northern Europe, namely England, regarding the status of 
workers. The essay’s conclusion suggests that more comparative studies are needed to bring 
the socioeconomic and the sociolegal perspectives into a proper dialogue, so as to shed new 
light on the nature and development of capitalism over the longue durée. 
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Economic Histories, National and Global 
 
Since its beginning as a discipline, economic history has had a close relationship with 
national historiographies and become part of those myths essential for states’ self-
representation. This is particularly evident in the case of Italy, where the triumphant narrative 
of “medieval economic primacy” was actively used as a functional tool for the creation of a 
unitary national identity from the very origins of the Risorgimento—the movement for the 
creation of an Italian unified nation-state.5 I have discussed this in detail elsewhere.6 
However, what is important to highlight here is how the relationship between economic and 
political development is deeply embedded into the topic, and I shall return later to how this 
has affected the development of economic history as a discipline. 
In a recent analytical synthesis, Lucio Pezzolo describes the salient characteristics of 
the Italian variety of capitalism: its deep roots in kin and family and its implications for the 
life cycle of firms and the resilience of investment; the strength of the interaction between 
formal and informal networks, aimed at guaranteeing a wealth of both financial and social 
capital and a swift and efficient information system; and the resulting complex interaction 
between political systems and economic activities. Through a discussion of the three classic 
case studies—Florence, Genoa, and Venice—Pezzolo highlights the common elements 
fostering the creation of commercial patriciates across the peninsula, while at the same time 
discussing the different outcomes connected with the differences in ‘professional’ 
specialization, ideological variants, and demographic variables.7 For the remainder of this 
article, I shall keep Pezzolo’s considerations as the background and focus instead on 
considerations that emerge from the comparative analysis of documentary evidence on two 
connected issues: wage labor and risk diversification. 
I shall concentrate my analysis and reflections on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Mediterranean maritime trade. In regard to Italy, this period is traditionally discussed almost 
exclusively in terms of crisis, whether relative or absolute. However, for economic (and 
maritime) history this period represents a crucial turning point in the relative fortunes of 
northern and southern Europe, and for this reason, the interaction between different economic 
systems allows for some fruitful comparisons in terms of business models.8 This is not the 
place to enter into a debate on the exact onset of Italian ‘decline’—a topic with a 
frighteningly large bibliography9—beyond maybe arguing that the analysis of ‘decline’ is a 
most useful avenue for the analysis of economic (historical) behavior, possibly even more 
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relevant than that of ‘growth’ in terms of actual relevance for contemporary observers of the 
European and U.S. economies.10 
The notion that medieval Italy was the cradle of capitalism was not just an “Italian 
tale.” Within the development arc sketched above, Italy took pride of place as a center of 
economic and financial innovation, as argued by N. S. B Gras, the father of ‘business 
history.’11 And here we come to a first important conundrum, which is rarely addressed yet 
sits like an elephant in the middle of any room where these issues are discussed. The modern 
academic discipline of ‘history,’ for all its contemporary ambitions to be ‘global,’ is a true 
daughter of the nineteenth century, the product of a love match between the emerging nation-
state and Romanticism. As such, it is inexorably linked to the nation-state, and the same 
applies to economic history. For the latter this is particularly evident in its quantitative 
incarnation, as all price series have been constructed on the basis of national data sets, while 
all major premodern similar endeavors were similarly constructed projecting those same 
methodology backward in time.12 
In approaching transnational histories, the trailblazers have been intellectual historians 
who, in tracing the genealogies of European ‘high’ culture, have always assumed the 
centrality of the transnational element. From the nineteenth century, legal historians focusing 
on canon law have pursued a comparable effort.13 Transnational economies histories had a 
longer gestation. Since the beginning, the study of “seas” has been a favorite field of 
investigation. Fernard Braudel was the pioneer, and a few others followed in his footsteps, 
breaking through the strictures of national narratives; however, this was stifled with the rise 
of the quantitativists and their reliance on statistical data collected on a national scale.14 The 
qualitativists fought back, and here, just one example will suffice: the classic La Repubblica 
Internazionale del Denaro, a book that surprises me every time I read it as it seems to get 
better with time.15 Still, it is only very recently that the option of pursuing transnational 
(economic) histories has truly entered into the mainstream of historiographical analysis.16 
Interestingly, business historians have been the protagonists in the most stimulating 
discussions. Faced with the issues developing out of contemporary globalization, they are 
turning their interest to the development of the multinational enterprise (MNEs) moving 
‘beyond the firm’ and discussing them as an agent of global change, investigating the extent 
to which MNEs have fostered such phenomena as integrated markets, technology transfer, 
inclusive institutions, and human capital formation.17 
 
Maritime and Economic/Business History 
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The study of the legal framework and economic institutions underpinning maritime 
business in the premodern period is extremely relevant to all the debates just mentioned and 
can provide plenty of interesting material to further them. The past two decades have seen a 
comprehensive reevaluation of economic growth within the early modern period, and within 
this revisionist strand, the maritime sector has taken pride of place.18 Social and economic 
analysis of the premodern European maritime sector is opening new areas that are extremely 
relevant to both business and economic historians. In particular, the study of commercial 
litigation is providing a deeper understanding of those interactions between states that shaped 
early modern European political economy, as these controversies embody wider concerns 
about international commercial competition.19 Given that maritime trade was characterized 
by transnationality in the early modern period, analysis of its legal controversies—be these 
about wages or jurisdictional boundaries—is an excellent testing ground of the interaction 
between different pathways of economic development and their legal framework—in other 
words, between different ‘national varieties’ of capitalism. This approach also allows a 
revisitation of the Keynesian theme of ‘uncertainty,’ somewhat neglected by neoclassic 
orthodoxy yet essential to the analysis of any aspect of maritime trade.20 
The specific Venetian (more than a generally ‘Italian’) angle is especially relevant 
here, as the topics of maritime trade and risk evaluation—both in commercial and military 
terms—were pioneered by Frederic Lane within the history of Venice, thanks to the particular 
state-run version of capitalism that flourished there.21 The ‘Venetian way to capitalism’ is in 
itself a somewhat distinct path of development, even when compared with that of other 
Italian states: Venice’s economy first developed services, then trade, then agriculture and 
manufacture—in reverse order to the traditional narrative. These peculiarities, frequently 
articulated in terms of ‘uniqueness,’ have somewhat limited the presence of Venice within 
comparative analyses even within the Italian peninsula, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
they formed the bedrock of Lane’s own contribution to the ‘origin of capitalism’ narrative, 
not only positing the primacy of Venice in being “capitalistic in the sense that its ruling class 
made their livelihood by employing wealth in the form of commercial capital” but also—and 
possibly more controversially—arguing that the Venetian ruling class “used their control of 
government to increase their profits.”22 This alternative approach allowed Lane to arrive at 
the conceptualization of ‘protection costs,’ the relevance of which goes well beyond the 
history of Venice and, indeed, of capitalism proper.23 
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Moving from the medieval to the early modern period, the maritime sector achieved 
in these later centuries a far wider importance, as the main tool of European global 
expansion. Seamen were both the essential protagonists of the fastest-growing sector in the 
European economy and the necessary tool of state/empire expansion and defense.24 Their 
entire lives were spent at the frontier between these two realities and different (differing?) 
rhetorical discourses. And this had important consequences beyond their economic treatment, 
affecting the conditions of their employment at large, both during and after their working 
lives, as it also shaped their social status and their reputation as a professional category.25 
 
Wage Litigation and Risk Management 
 
The starting point of my investigations was the wealth of legal controversies I 
discovered in Italian state archives (especially in Venice, Genoa, and Livorno), which 
showed how northern European seamen—primarily English, but also Dutch—tried to use to 
their advantage the more worker-friendly policies in Italy in order to enforce their existing 
agreements and, at the same time, to achieve better economic conditions from their 
masters/captains. I originally conceived this comparative study of maritime employment 
during the early modern period as the juxtaposition of different national strategies and 
attitudes concerning wage laborers and their juridical and social status. I posited the issue of 
northern crews in the Mediterranean, and the reasons for their success, as a simple case of 
‘comparative advantage’: northerners paid their crews less often and thus enjoyed a larger 
availability of capital during their business cycle. I reasoned exclusively in economic terms, 
presupposing that, given that personnel’s wages are a cost that is not very compressible, 
delaying their disbursement had the immediate effect of increasing the working capital of 
their masters and merchants. 
However, the evidence showed a far more complex situation. What I and my team 
discovered in the archives was a less linear story, in that a simple juxtaposition between ships 
and crews of different nations was tempered by an impressive amount of transnational 
shipping. It quickly became evident that the northerners in that period were true protagonists 
of intra-Mediterranean trade, with the corollary results being that they frequently employed 
multinational crews and provided transport services for a truly varied and international set of 
merchants.26 Classic British scholarly literature had posited a simple equivalence between the 
nationality of shipping and that of trade; however, this most definitely proved not to be the 
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case. Then, as now, transport and trade are two rather different analytical categories, and we 
historians should pay far more attention to this fact. 
Still, comparison between ‘national’ systems confirmed some truly stark differences. 
The bottom line was that, in general, the agreements finalized in the North of Europe 
included substantially worse contractual conditions than those available in Italy. Working and 
living in close contact with crewmen coming from different countries with different 
customary regulations, northern seamen in the Mediterranean learned of these differences and 
took advantage of them in an attempt to improve their own situation. The problem was not so 
much the amount of pay itself, as a general stability and convergence of figures emerges from 
the documents; rather, what truly differed was the manner and frequency of wage 
disbursement.27 
In the North of Europe generally, after an advance (usually equivalent to two months’ 
wages and frequently paid straight to the seamen’s families) was paid at the moment of the 
agreement itself, the rest of the wages were paid only “if and when the voyage was 
concluded,” which meant when the ship returned to her original port of departure.28 With 
vessels frequently reemployed within the Mediterranean, often spending years sailing there, 
this was clearly not a viable option, and renegotiations between masters and crews about 
destinations and wages became the norm, thus multiplying the opportunities for 
disagreements and legal challenges. As masters and shipowners employed any possible 
delaying tactic to avoid actually disbursing the entirety of due wages to their crews, this led 
to increased litigation, which frequently ended up in court even though arbitration was also a 
possible avenue of extrajudicial resolution.29 
The issue of delayed wage disbursement, with its trail of litigations, remained a 
constant issue behind the presence of English seafarers in the Mediterranean throughout the 
second half of the seventeenth century. In Venice it also spilled from the local civil courts 
into diplomatic exchanges between the Republic and England. The firm position originally 
expressed by English merchants and masters in 1646—that seamen in England received an 
advance at time of agreement, followed by full payment only upon their return to England—
had shifted by 1679, and they argued instead that for ‘long journeys’ (and Venice was 
considered one of those) one-third of wages were disbursed at the time of the agreement, one-
third at the unloading of the goods at destination, and the last third on return to England.30 
Throughout this time, Venetian authorities tried to discover exactly what those “laws, usages 
and customs of England” said about wages, and they were most puzzled that no act of 
Parliament dealt with the issue. This absence of enacted legislation in England, paired with 
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the fast-paced Mediterranean commercial shipping market, created a situation in which local 
authorities tended to side with the crew and adjudicate against the masters’ harsher position.31 
Richard Blakemore, writing about England, and Tijl Vanneste, on the Low Countries, 
convincingly demonstrate the complexity of seamen’s remuneration throughout the 
seventeenth century and point out how the variety of payment options was both at the root of 
frequent litigation, but also allowed for some small-scale entrepreneurship to develop even 
among the lower ranks of seafarers.32 
Studies of maritime history, in its traditional incarnation, always assumed a 
substantive homogeneity of maritime legislation and legal customs, as the operational nature 
of life and work at sea was seen as a unifying factor above and beyond national differences. 
Recent scholarship in both maritime and commercial legal history is demolishing such 
assumptions, and the results of my projects confirm these findings.33 
Variations between different countries’ norms regarding maritime matters were, 
indeed, the basis of fundamental differences in the performance of economic activities in 
different states. When English or Dutch seamen brought their cases in front of ‘foreign’ 
courts, the ‘law’ (employed here in a wide sense to include also customs and usages) used to 
argue seamen’s rights and their access to wages was the product of a different society—not of 
the ‘home’ country of the actors. Assuming that, in line with those proposing the existence of 
a medieval lex mercatoria/maritima, maritime legislation and customary practices were the 
same all over Europe, then going to court in Venice, Marseille, or Genoa should have yielded 
exactly the same outcome as in London or Amsterdam. Yet this was not the case; indeed, 
outcomes differed substantially depending on where access to justice was sought. Thus, “So, 
although the common roots of maritime legislation are indeed to be found in the ‘holy 
trinity’—Lex Rhodia, Rôles d’Oléron and Llibre del Consolat de Mar—it is clear that local 
variations existed and had a pivotal importance in shaping the outcome of court judgements. 
Different states’ social and political attitudes towards wage workers are an obvious starting 
point to continue these investigations, but political influence over market rules regarding 
sailors’ employment—such as the growing tension between the mercantile and defence 
sectors—is among the other variables that need to become part of the equation.”34 
What do these differences in the legal and institutional framework of maritime trade 
tell us about varieties of capitalism? I would like to start with a classic, and most useful, 
definition of capitalism, provided by Joyce Appleby: “Capitalism is a cultural system rooted 
in economic practices that rotate around the imperative of private investors to turn a profit. 
Profit seeking usually promotes production efficiencies like the division of labour, economies 
9 
 
of size, specialization, the expansion of the market for one’s goods, and, above all, 
innovation. Because capitalism is a cultural and not simply an economic one, it cannot be 
explained by material factors alone.”35 Next, turning to a brief synthesis of some other 
factors, I briefly discuss England and then Italy/Venice. 
 
Varieties of Capitalism: English 
 
The maritime sector was for centuries a crucial element of the English, and later 
British, economy. Interestingly, though, it has not been a central protagonist in the (massive) 
historiography on the origin of English capitalism. Instead, this historiography has focused on 
the development of proto-industry and the structure of agricultural production. These are 
telling choices. 
Interest in the roots of the Industrial Revolution was, since its beginning, a topic of 
great scholarly activity. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the successful 
capitalization of land has become the main focus of investigation, the unquestioned 
protagonist of the golden age of Marxian British historiography.36 This was part of a larger 
pan-European debate on the ‘transition from feudalism to capitalism’ that started with Marx 
himself and came to full bloom during the central decades of the twentieth century, when it 
occupied some of the best historical minds of that time.37 In more recent times, the so-called 
revolt of the early modernists has, for those working on both English and Dutch economies,  
further stimulated the analysis of the element of commercial dynamism connected with this 
period.38 
The topic is massive, and the space is limited here. I shall focus on those points raised 
by the literature on agrarian capitalism, which also have some bearing on employment in the 
maritime sector. Jane Whittle synthesizes the early modern drive toward controlling the labor 
force as follows: “In controlling the nature of labour, the legislation had three major concerns 
other than the control of wages. It sought to strengthen the enforcement of servants’ 
contracts, to force unmarried casual workers and the unemployed to become servants, and to 
control the mobility of servants and labourers.”39 A further element is how this influenced 
general risk management, and here I rely on David Ormrod, in his synthesis of issues raised 
originally by Adam Smith and discussed further by Avner Offer: “The distinctiveness of 
English land tenure lay in the ease with which landowners were able to shift risk onto the 
farmer. Rack-renting essentially involved the conversion of rent from a residual surplus into a 
fixed overhead, leaving the farmer to bear the burden of risk and market fluctuation. The 
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English tenurial system, in other words, can be seen as ‘an arrangement for converting 
agriculture, an inherently risky enterprise, into landownership, a secure and stable one’.”40 
The analysis of early modern agrarian, commercial, and labor developments, though, 
has yet to blend into a comprehensive and properly organic analysis of English early modern 
economic development. This is truly an important gap in the relevant scholarship and thus in 
our understanding of the dynamics at play and their interactions. As Britain reached global 
economic primacy in the nineteenth century (when the modern discipline of history was 
born), this caused not just the global spread of its own variant of capitalism but—crucially for 
scholars—also the terms of the debate about capitalism for the following centuries. Let us not 
forget that the whole debate on capitalism comes from Marx—and that Marx was writing in 
England at the height of the British Empire. 
How does the maritime sector fit within these issues? At the beginning of the early 
modern period, England was a profoundly rural and agrarian society; it started to acquire a 
new political and economic appreciation of the sea only from the second half of the sixteenth 
century, under the pressures of war with Spain. However, the stress on the importance of the 
maritime sector was, since its inception with Richard Hakluyt’s work, conceptualized as 
primarily a political element and later developed into an imperial one.41 It is worth noting 
how the maritime sector—in both its commercial and naval elements—truly took off with the 
essential political support of Parliament during the late 1640s and early 1650s, during the 
profound political and ideological disruption at the time of the civil wars.42 Within British 
history, this intertwining of the political and economic elements has been a longue durée 
element as the shifting of power between Whigs and Tories, with their antithetical 
conceptions of the economy, strongly affected (consciously and subconsciously) 
historiographic production over the past few centuries.43 
The growing importance of the maritime sector to economic development and growth 
was very clear at the time. But it was always conceptualized along the peculiar political lines 
just mentioned. A good example here is the work of Sir William Petty, writing at the end of 
the seventeenth century, who argued strongly about the importance of seafaring within both 
the imperial and the capitalist development of England, declaring his appreciation of seamen 
as the “very pillars of the English nation and empire” and discussing how their work created 
that “overplus” [surplus] central to the “accumulation” of capital.44 Thus the whole 
discussion on the maritime sector contribution developed more along the lines of a ‘political 
economy’ discourse than of a more technical economic analytical slant. The maritime sector 
included a varied set of different types of employment, characterized by strong regional 
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variations in terms of financial organization and legal customary frameworks. It included 
several different typologies of activities: the fisheries, dependent on local shared investment; 
short-range shipping, partially reliant on the seasonal labor of smallholders (here more 
similar to the agricultural sector); long-distance corporate shipping under the aegis of the 
trading companies; and private trade.45 Pairing this internal variety of business with the proud 
exceptionalism of the British maritime world and scholarship, it is no surprise that the sector 
remained isolated from the mainstream economic narrative.46 
Wage disbursement within the English maritime sector was neatly encapsulated in the 
formula “freight is the mother of wage.”47 In actual practice this meant that seamen’s wages 
were based not on the work effectively done by them but on successful completion of the 
ship’s voyage. Thus, in line with Petty’s argument, it is possible to argue that the methods 
and frequency of wage disbursement to seamen played a crucial role in the cycle of capital 
accumulation: that is, denying regular payment of wages allowed capital to be invested 
elsewhere. Quite apart from the direct connection between ‘freight’ and ‘wage,’ other 
explanations were given for the late disbursement, such as keeping ships appropriately 
manned, avoiding desertion, and the paternalist approach to seamen—weak in the flesh and 
prone to waste their earnings—in a very open discourse of social control, which was the 
reason most frequently employed by English diplomats in dealing with these controversies 
abroad.48 
English seamen found themselves at the intersection between the two main 
interpretative strands about the rise of British capitalism: the new Smithian, centered on the 
rise of market relations and trade; and the productionist, focused on the dispossession of 
small landowners and the rise of wage labor.49 What emerges from the analysis of their 
working conditions, the legal frameworks of their employment, and the changes in their 
compensation is the increasing encroachment of their traditional liberties and customary 
working conditions, and the growing implementation—within the maritime sector—of those 
para-servile working relations that characterized the development of agrarian capitalism.50 
All are experiences that converged in the early conditions of employment in the English 
Industrial Revolution. 
Adding to those problems descending from the ‘freight is the mother of wage’ maxim, 
whatever room to maneuver had earlier existed for seamen within the folds of local customs 
and usages, and whatever window of opportunity was opened to them by resorting to foreign 
(Italian) courts, was closed in 1729 with the first legislation enacted by Parliament regarding 
maritime labor. With the Act for the Better Regulation and Government of Seamen in the 
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Merchants Service, the whole sector was subject to a standardization of conditions of 
employment along the lines of landlubber wage laborers. The flexibility and variety of usages 
that had been a factor in some parts of the English maritime sector disappeared, and written 
contracts of employment became mandatory; on the one hand, this provided more certainty, 
but on the other, it also eroded traditional freedoms and imposed new regulations.51 The latter 
were connected with the agrarian deep roots of the English economy and with the blending of 
the employment heritage of a feudal society with bourgeoning capitalist needs. By closing all 
spaces for autonomy available to wage laborers, the practical effect was to transform them 
into effective ‘serfs’—maybe not legally, but certainly functionally.52 
In line with what had happened in the agrarian sector and was happening in the proto-
industrial one, the maritime sector was also tightening its grip on its labor force. In England, 
what emerged from the Industrial Revolution was not “a general model of the contract of 
employment which could be applied to all wage-dependent workers, but instead a 
hierarchical model of service, which originated in the Master and Servant Act and was 
assimilated into common law.”53 
 
Varieties of Capitalism: Italian/Venetian 
 
The custom of delaying full payment until the end of a maritime commercial venture 
was in fact common throughout Europe. However, on the northern shores of the 
Mediterranean, and especially in Italy, delaying full payment meant that only part of the wage 
was disbursed at the end of each month, and the rest retained until the end of the trip. The 
connection between seamen’s wages and the payment of freight is also discussed in the 
fundamental Mediterranean compilation of maritime laws and customs, the Consolat.54 
However, the Consolat is clear in providing clear measures of protection for seamen’s wages: 
“Article 62 gives preference to seafarers for their wages on cargo and, in Article 93, there is a 
preference, if not lien, for wages on the ship.”55 
In Venice, unsurprisingly, the issue of seamen’s wages had been the object of close 
legislative attention since the early Middle Ages, and it was the object of important 
legislation twice during the seventeenth century, first in 1602 and then in 1682. The latter 
measures largely confirmed those promulgated in 1602: specifically, a minimum of two-
thirds of the people on every Venetian ship should be of the Natione Veneta—that is to say, 
citizens and subjects of the Republic.56 When these regulations were implemented, specific 
chapters were published that enshrined in law what, until then, had been common practice 
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across Venetian territories regarding the disbursement of wages: two months paid in advance 
when boarding the ship, with monthly installments to follow, but only two-thirds of the 
monthly wage to actually be disbursed, so that at the end of the journey each seaman was still 
owed one-third of his total wage. In this way, seamen received cash throughout the journey 
but were also incentivized to continue their service and not jump ship.57 Italian seamen were 
no more socially elevated, nor less prone to wasteful spending, than their northern 
counterparts. Disbursement was incremental; however, seamen regularly received part of 
their payment each month, allowing them the freedom either to waste it in harbor taverns or 
to invest in microentrepreneurship ventures—in short, the freedom to use their hard-earned 
money.58 
For English seamen used to the kind of treatment sketched earlier, the freedom and 
opportunities available in the Mediterranean must have been intoxicating, and it is no surprise 
that mutinies were common there.59 Exposed to the regular pay schedule of the 
Mediterranean shipping industry, they realized the opportunities that were available, and took 
advantage of them via their access to local courts.60 Regular access to part of their wages was 
also effectively a way of acquiring some small capital themselves. Wages become capital 
when they are used for the purpose of ventures intended to make capital; thus, having capital 
available—or not—becomes the fundamental determinant in defining the nature and status of 
labor.61 
Across the Italian peninsula, at least since the thirteenth century, the development of a 
highly commercial (and, later, financial) economy—the Italian roots of ‘capitalism’—was 
connected with intellectual and political discussions that focused on the dignity of work.62 
These multifaceted medieval discussions, both civic and theological, contributed to the 
emergence of a conception of labor, and of its value and worth, that differed profoundly from 
that which emerged from the feudal world, whose ideology dominated in other parts of 
Europe, particularly in England. And in this fundamentally different vision of human labor 
resides a crucial element of real difference between varieties of European capitalisms. 
The Italian way to capitalism was based on a strong and articulated conception of 
community with jurisdictional and social implications. This is not to argue that the Italian 
medieval society was more ‘equal’ or ‘democratic,’ but it certainly recognized the value of all 
labor in a way that better preserved the dignity of individuals. The discussion of wage labor 
included the same conceptual and linguistic ambiguities present in most of Europe, but the 
earlier and wider level of specialization among Italy’s workers—even those engaged in arti 
meccaniche—effectively granted them a better social standing.63 Also, proper appreciation of 
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their contribution to society allowed some Italian states to grant workers rights, including 
formal protection of those rights, in times of economic or personal difficulties. Giacomo 
Todeschini argues convincingly for the importance of these debates, not just within the 
cultural realm but also in the effective governance of economic activities and legislative 
implementation.64 This is certainly confirmed by the extant archival evidence. 
The fundamental issue at play reaches well beyond legislative efforts and states’ 
proto-political economies. It concerns the nature of human beings—whether they are worthy 
of respect and, therefore, of the money they have earned through their labor or whether their 
low social status denies them full ownership and enjoyment of the fruits of that labor. The 
discussion of these issues has so far been based on a narrative centered on the Anglo-
American/Atlantic world, and that perspective has been essentialized as ‘European,’ while, in 
truth, there were other European practices. Maybe it is time to reconsider them not just as 
‘failures’ of the past but as ways to understand the present and reconceptualize the future. 
 
Varieties of Capitalism and Global Economic History—as a Conclusion 
 
One of the essential and, as yet, unfulfilled requirements to produce proper global 
(economic) history is to start with a nuanced and profound knowledge of the different 
fundamental concerns that distinguish individual national historiographies. In practice, this 
means, first, detailed knowledge and comprehension of the embedded biases and cultural 
concerns.65 Then, it entails the ability to take these concerns as legitimate ones, both 
culturally and intellectually, which is also essential to a proper understanding of the roots of 
the methodological choices employed in their production.66 
This kind of exercise should be developed further in economic and business histories, 
both subdisciplines that over the past two decades have self-consciously tried to escape from 
the shackles of nation-centric approaches. This has proven particularly difficult, though, 
especially within economic history, because of the tight connection—which we can probably 
even call embeddedness—between (a) the methodologies and ideological basis of economic 
history and (b) the Anglo-American intellectual paradigm. So, for all the conversations and 
debates in the realm of contemporary policy and economics about variances of capitalism, to 
which I briefly referred at the beginning of this article, it is (perhaps paradoxically) within 
economic and business history that the discussion appears to still be anchored to a linear 
development focused on the reasons behind both the “little divergence” and the Great 
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Divergence, the victorious narrative of the English Industrial Revolution and the subsequent 
emergence and hegemony of U.S. capitalism on a global scale. 
The practical result has been to flatten the methodological options and to assume that 
the ‘normal’ way of interpreting economic development is to take the Anglo-American 
developmental arc as the template, against which other variants of capitalism are just less 
successful variations, which automatically disqualifies them from having individual validity 
on their own merit. In interpretative terms, this is not in itself a novel issue, as the existence 
of other economic systems is at the core of several extra-European approaches and most 
active within postcolonial historical analysis at least since the illuminating work of Dipesh 
Chakrabarty.67 What I want to propose here is to employ a similar perspective when 
discussing these issues within in an intra-European comparative perspective. The same title 
of Chakrabarty’s paradigm-shifting book, Provincializing Europe, hints at this issue of 
comparison between Europe, a byword for ‘the West’, and ‘the rest.’ But premodern Europe 
was not a monolith any more than it is today, and my ambition is to provide the other 
European side of the story, arguing that historically within Europe there have always been 
profound differences about economic development and pathways to growth, reflected in the 
contributions of different economic actors. 
Different capitalisms led to different paths of economic development.68 The 
divergences sketched above, regarding how practical attitudes to wage labor shaped the 
institutional responses of states, naturally lead to a difficult but unavoidable question: Was 
the loss of workers’ rights and the consequent concentration of capital in the hands of the 
entrepreneurial elite one of the necessary prerequisites for the English Industrial Revolution? 
A similar argument has been made in regard to the contribution of slave labor.69 Can the 
same be argued of maritime wage labor? 
It makes sense here to refer back to N. S. B. Gras. In his classic essay on the concept 
of capitalism, originally written in the 1940s, he commented that “we are commonly more 
interested . . . in the temporary ill effects of the [Industrial Revolution] on the workers than 
we are in the social revolution in the field of administration.”70 ‘Administration,’ as the 
practical daily activities of running premodern business, remains an understudied subfield in 
which a lot of work is still needed. Nearly eighty years later, there is a new interest in the 
position of workers, and recent studies based on the analysis of both the agricultural and 
proto-industrial sectors have linked long-term economic growth to a general increased 
coercion and the imposition of legal constraints on labor mobility across Eurasia.71 To this I 
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would add that recent global economic developments have shown us how those ‘ill effects’ 
that Gras mentioned have proven, alas, to be anything but temporary. 
At the center of both of my research projects on the political economy of maritime 
trade is ultimately the analysis of risk management, the universal concern of all businesses, 
regardless of their chronology or sector of activity. For the premodern maritime sector, risk 
management is a particularly complex issue, as the interplay of working capital, insurance 
costs, and the continuing relevance of sea loans throughout the period all had important 
implications for calculations of capital flow within the business enterprise. 
What is already emerging from the preliminary results, though, is how the English 
maritime mantra ‘freight is the mother of wage,’ as nuanced as it might have been in its 
effective implementation, is a powerful and vivid statement of how English (maritime) 
capitalism shifted the entrepreneur’s risk onto the working poor. I am currently working at 
trying to understand whether this effectively signals a different cultural perception of risk per 
se, but it is certainly evidence of an unwillingness of ‘northern’ maritime entrepreneurs to 
share risk in an equitable manner. I would argue that what allows this attitude was (is?) the 
profoundly feudal nature of an English society that saw wage workers as ‘servants.’ Mutatis 
mutandis Avner Offer’s argument also works for the maritime sector, notwithstanding the 
resilience it showed in resisting these changes. The maritime world ends up being not so 
‘unique’ after all. 
I will end by returning to where I started. Piketty’s analysis of historical changes in 
the concentration of income and wealth since the Industrial Revolution concludes that under 
the present system, wealth grows faster than economic output. In other words, the present 
capitalist system is designed so as to benefit investors above all others. 
Jean-Yves Grenier sees a qualitative change in the final section of Piketty’s volume, 
in which Piketty proposes possible explanations and solutions. Grenier argues that from an 
‘economic’ argument Piketty moves into the social sciences (and I find this interesting, as it 
assumes economics is an exact science and not a ‘social’ one), but I would instead say that 
Piketty moves on to a cultural analysis, based on the increase—from the 1990s, in the United 
States especially but also globally—of social tolerance of wages/income inequality. Grenier 
sees the previous period (starting after World War I) as a sort of moral economy in which 
wages were, generally, distributed over a curve that reflected marginal productivity, while 
this link is now broken.72 If this is indeed the case, and Piketty is right in seeing the profits 
from capital (rente) as always higher than growth—that is, that this is the norm of 
contemporary capitalism—then investigating the premodern roots of this can be a useful way 
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to further differentiate between different varieties of capitalism. The lack of balance between 
income from rente and labor, after all, resonates with what happened in classic European 
feudal economies; as such, capitalism—or, to be precise, the currently triumphant Anglo-
American variety of capitalism—might turn out to be not so different from feudalism. It is a 
question worth asking, especially in light of the profound malaise that many European 
societies are currently showing toward it. 
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